It is still too early to muse upon all the occurences that caused the crisis of the system of ex-Yugoslavia as the aggression is expanding and manifesting itself more and more drastically.Dozens of ravaged cities, some half a million people brutally murder and two million refugees in the present result of the frantic strive of the previous system (government, party and army machinery) which, by making a change in its image (taking for its new slogan "in wthe name of the nation" instead of the previous "in the name of the class") ,is trying to maintain itself.To tell the truth,there is also an international side to the problem,not to forget a dimension of instumentalization of other manifestations of nationalism either.
That is why the aim of this contemplation is only to emphasize some major moments that had and still do affect both the manifestation of this drastic nationalism and the speculation on its further course.
1. Especially because of the govermment constantly fortifying itself, rather than the society in which it persisted, socialism turned out to be too weak and uned the method of increase of lawfulness instead of democratization, and the system itself functioned on the basis of "holy trinity" state-party -army.
2.The downfall of socialism in East European countries gave rise to a series of now questions on the contemporary world. They were in the first place questtions on the choice of the new type of development and influences.There appeared new room for influence which would directly of the warsaw treaty arouse a question of the aim of existence of NATO but also the principles of the organisation of the new European Community.
3. Of particular importance to the problem as a whole is the fall of the Berlin wall and the union of Germeny. Unions as well as disintegrations of social systems are anything but painless. As the development (economic, democratic etc.) of West Germeny "entered" Eastern Germeny,so has the underdevelopment of the latter "entered" the former (on the principle of joined vessels). This can be illustrated by the fact that Kohl`s government hes a foreing debt of 400 billion DM.The solution to this problem is also very dubious, the increase of lawfulness has its good and bad sides. The second possible solution to the German crisis is the effort of transfering the debt to "somene else" in the contry itself or outside of it.
4. The downfall of Yugoslav socialism is very peculiar. Everything that so far has been an advantage of this type of society, when compared to other socialist countriss, has now turned into the biggest possible disaster. That system, too,worked according to the principle of the "holy trinity" state-party -army, the authority of which had been Josip Broz-Tito. Tito had been the president of the state, the president of the party and the supreme commander of the army. Hovever, the society was structured in the way that there were only two cathegories of factors: the bureaucratic government and peple as the "class", as distinguished from other socialist countries where there were two bureaucracies (the domestic bureaucrecy and the one in the USSR) and the people. In these systems (Poland, Checoslovakia, Hungary, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria) the domastic bureaucracy had no possibilities for developing into a tyrant but it was always ap to a cerrtain point in a sekret alliance with its own peple. The domesttic bureaucracy in most of these contries became legitimate before its people during the new changes, immediately after thedownfall of the USSR government, being avare thet even in the new circumstances (democratization, private property it was again to have the most opportunities possible. To tell the truth, not as a class or as a party any more bat as a clan or as private businessmen or politicians.
Romania was an exception, its system trying to preserve the state of affars by all means. However, the placing of the army on the side of the people determined the outcome of the future events. The Yugoslav model of government " in the name of socialism" had a great chance in 1948 with the cancellation with Eastren Bloc Countries (the Resolution of Information Bureau of the Cominform) to go its own way towards the demokratization. owever, the communist party, not being willing to share its authority with any other party, went on searching for democratization by making circles within its own program, its own knowledge, the adjustment of cadres and the loss of self-control.
Duiring the whole period after the second world war in Yugoslavia there was a strengthening of the authorities but also a transformation of the rulling and the only party; departing from avangarde, elite of its members with a lot of unreal priviledges and coming to nationalism, or rether, nazism as its extreme target.
5. The departure of Josip Broz Tito, a personality capable of providing the Yugoslav system with numerous friends, revealed all the deficiencies and frailties of the "holy trinity" and showed it to be an untenable system. The statal machinery had 52% men-power more then it is objektively intended to by the European standard and 300% privileges more the it is supposed to be possible. The communist party did not face any opposition parties which in a democratic society are basic for the control of both the ideas and the programme and because of thet it has remained not only without control, but also without its rationality which would help it maintain its authority. During that period the army was making a militarizartion of the society instead of the third in Europe, Yugoslavia had its own faktory of weapons, tanks and other most modern armamentes and it had more generals than the USA (a tragicomic vice-president Kostic just before leaving,sent into retirement 35 generals of the ex YU army and it could not even be felt.)
6. The outcome of the Yugoslav crisis could take two directions. The one implying peaceful reforms aided by "powerful arguments" and it was the one offered by Ante Markovic. The other one by the "arguments of force" offered by the forces of the system itself which declared to be representin the interests of the strongest nation (the most numerous one, which, with its machinery and armaments of the third army in Europe, became the most powerful one).
7. The point is not how it was possible to instrumentalize the nationalisms, but how it was possible to direct the whole system of the multinational Yugoslav community together with all of its institutions towards one nationalism, or rather, how the nationalist policy of the Great Serbia succeeded in becoming their master without any more significant re-establishments of balance by fear or without any divisions in the army itself or other institutions of the stste. Thet certainly is a great question which tells up to which point they really were multi-national.
8. The oisting of the Serbien flag in the milieu of the Kosovian myth stroungly supported by the Serbian Orthodox church, the intellectuals and even by the students, dispersed all the doubts of the experts on both the content and the form of the political image on the present events. Remember the famous thought by Cosic, leter on quoted by Draskovic:"We, the Serbs, lose during peace everything thet we get during war." Unfortunately, though it might look as a dirge, it implies the strategic appearance of the instrumentalized nationalism. It openly states thet the Serbs are for the war rather than for peace and that their policy should be turned in thet direction. It is to be noted thet Mussolini instrumentalized fascism in Italy with a similar thesis:"We do not entertain the illusion of the possibility of existence of eternal peace and of its use for us. War is morally hightening for the people."
9. From this strategic political taget (Great national state by means of war) in the instrumentalization of nationalism it was nacessery to direkt technically the astivites of thet policy towards a point between the extreme of being imperilled and of superiority of thet vety nation whoch was predsetioned to rule and set free end, finally, the political follower was to, be turned into a solidier by and means. Keeping the aforementioned in mind, one can understand why the siege was raised on the massmedia together with a total monopoly over them, why the Serbs are "imperilled" by the Albanians and the opposition in Belgrad, as will sa by the Slovenes the Croats, the Bosnjaks, the Hungaris, the Macedoniens atc. why all the pits and graves were dug up, often also those of chetniks crime and the non- Serbian population (in Bileca and Stolac) to bury the bones in a ritual of the martyrs, why so many absurd books and artickles were written on the topic of the superiority of the Serbs and why the letest book-fais in Belgrade offered exclusively the titles abaut in, not to forget "No one mustbeat joy!"
10.The demonstration of therely power in the federal institutions cold only begin as it did in Kosovo. It was there thet the federal army and the police were used in an inter-national conflict on the sida of Serbier nationalism for the first time.The there Was a suspension of the autonomy of the province of Kosovo and Vojvodina and the classical putsch in Montenegro, which in fact mede up a territory and cadres assumpation on the turther expansion of nationalism. The was a triumph of the monopoly of Slobodan Milosevic with strong support of the army , the police, and other statalpolitical-army mashinery. The decisivenss the ruthlesness of the use of force against political opposition in Belgrade during the demonstrations in March tells about the resolutenss with which the forceful manintaining of authorities was was carried out. In is not dobtful dhat Belgrad would haveanded up like Peking had the events taken a different course. It was hare thet the army demonstrated its allegince with a slogan "jeopardy of public order and peace". This mede everything ready för the tuning of Yugoslavia into Srboslavia, or tather, Ortodoxslavia.
11. A question arise as to what mede the exauthoriteties commit themselves and take those choices as the crisis in Yugoslavia as a community of southern slavic pepels but of the crisis of what was done in its name and of the crisis of the system of authorities itself. Howerer, the answer is quite simple. It is a pure force and momentary superiory. The Serbien nationalists know that if they declared themselves to be Yugoslav and the Serbier natio to bethe only Yugoslav one it would get some more time and force before domestic and foreign public opiniom. It would get moretime because in internnational relations what had been creating for years can hardly be changed, and thet was the case with both the name and the essence of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the Serbien nationalism becoms the heir of all the financial, statal and other institutions of the the system whitch itself has worked about 50 yers ( the contitution Yugoslavia, the Act on national defens, the monetary system, the federal army, the federal police, the representative bodis, consulates and ambassies in the word, the federal intelligence service TANJUG atc)
What definitaly made the authorities choose the Serbien nationalism in ots suvervival was the fact of the real position Serbien personnel during therie rule, or rather, the fact of the Serbien nation being the mostnumerous one and the one which could be instrumentalised according to the well-known principles of instrumentalization of peple with the advantages at its disposal from the very beginningl the (instituten of tested system, weapons etc)
In thet sens the disarmament of "a nation not fit dor Yugoslavia" was already carried out and so was already carried outand so was the sama time the enormous build-up of the "fit one". The actual Montenegrran managment identifid itself with the Serbs and automatically denied its Montenegran particulatrity). The codtody of weapons from secondary scgools, firms and rerritorial defence forces in the barracks of the federal army and then towards the station of the Serbien armed forces. It is inappropriate to talk abaut the extremists and abaut illegal grups of solidiers when, in fact, thet ava all a part of a well-organized system the from the military point of view functions perfectly. Among the Serbien population, the numer of those who hade enough possibilities and corage to oppose it is very small. These decent exceptions fight it all with weapons which is the only efficacious way. The leter protests of the Ortodox church, of a part of the intellectuals od students are only political moves or justifications before the conscience, because the appeared only after the strong support to the system and todey they are using the ineffective method of the "power of the arguments".
It is interesting to go see what is taking place on the other side
It is interesting to see what is taking place on the other side.
a. The Kosovo, conscious of the facts of difficult life conditions, of a big economic and political crisis, are gathering around the Albanien problem of "Kosovo republic" in Kosovo. The realization of thet political and economic target in the short run would be irrational and its sacrifices too big. However, in a longer period of time with vigorous political moves in the international map, with the internal policy, and avoiding the conflicts, the Albanians got themselves into a position whwre a majority of their problems is being solved by foreign factors, the neighbouring Albania but even the freilty of the political opponents in Belgrade. As regerds Belgrade itself, it practically preserved and, for the time being, deferred the problem of Kosovo by the use of force and the suspension of its sutonomy. Todey there is even the second possibility of the regime of Slobodan Milo(pi)evic being aware thet Kosovo is lost for Serbia and it is thus trying to make political and territorial castlings with the Krajinas military borders.
Given thet it would not be in the spirit of the nazi policy of Belgrade to leave Kosovo peacefully, the use of force is to be expected but of such force to have for its only aim devastation and killing (as in Bosnian and Hercegovina) and thet is searching its political allies in the Orthodox creed of the Greeks and of the Macedonians.
b. As regards Slovenia, there a national movement of the Slovenes expended. Their national program as well as other national programs, is in its essence very limited (one's own nation), quickly promoting (founded on the presumed worthiness of the nation), but before the facts of the inevitable disintegration of the Yugoslavia of the earlier type, and before the strengthening of Serbien nationalism and its fatal instrumentalisation, probably in the transitory phase of the gain of its independence and democratization as its only beneficial solution.
What prescribed the events in Slovenia, wich compared to the leter events, are neither so dramatic nor disastruous, firstly is the fact thet the Serbia nationalism was not interested in the territory of Slovenia (no "jeopardized" Serbian population) secondly, it was too risky to get involved in a war adventure among three strong states (Italy, Austria, Hungary) and thirdly, a powerful and resolute opposition to force in Slovenia.
Considering the use of tanks in Slovenia as a demonstration of force of the ex-federal army, the way of the use of its units and the terget, we can claim with cartainty thet it was the move of sacrificing dozens of young men of the ex-federal army in order to start reducing Yugoslavia to what has now been left of it (Serbien secession)
c. The nacional program was the one to win the first democratic elections in Croatia. It must be kept in mind that the greatest reliance of Croation Democratic Community (HDZ) and Tuman was given by Milo(pi)evic himself, thet Tuman is a solidier, a general, which means thet CDC (HDZ) took the events thet would follow with seriousness and the method of solution the one with the use of force. A new cause for the Serbian nationalist policy is the shess-board as a national symbol which, for historical reasons was impossible for the Serbs to accept as their own. Maybe thay even could have done so but they did not want to, stating thet the chess-board for them meant only Ustashas.
What is important in the estimation of the ultimate outcome of the conflict of the Croatian national program with the one of the Serbs, is the fact thet at the beginning none of the factors (man-power, technology, time and space) estimationg none of the factors (man-power, technology, time and space) estimating the outcome of the was on the Croatian side. Even worse, the internacional community, not seeing the essence of the conflict and the proportions of the forces, lays an embargo on the import of weapons. On the other side, Kadijevic, without letting know the federal prime minister Markovic, makes supplies of enormous amount of weapons from the USSR in spite of the fact that even without it they have an enormous advantage in the conflict. In thet sence the momentary situation on the battlefields whwre the military success of Croation armed forces is incontrovertible, even thet military inferiorit up to the level of the establishment of the balance of forces. The present situation on the battlefields of Croatia is cuch thet the ceasefire suits the Serbs (the problem is thet the Serbs came here by force) and they are satisfied also with buffer zones so thet in fact the UN forces are working in their favour, and the Serbs are regruping their forces towards other places where the fighting is still going on as well as the ethnic cleansing. Croatian forces are also playng for time now, because the position of their opponebts is quite crushing, speaking in terms of international relations. In Serbia itself, the authoroties use terror over the non-Serbian or the "unfit" Serbian populatrion, so thet in practice there are other forces working for Croatia. Especially if there is a conflict in Sandæak and Kosovo. Unfortunately, the stagnation of the democracy in Croatia, the military appearance in congenial political forces in Bosnia and Hercegovina to divide it ethnically, tells us about the other face of nationalist and war policy. It too has to take into account the principles thet werw fatal for Yugoslav policy and
thet is the reducion of the statal mechanism into a necessary measure and putting in under control of the legal staste and of the multy-party system. On the contrary, such a system (in order to maintain itself) produces an excess of enemies, firstly among the non-Croats and, secondly, among the "politically unfit" Croats. The destiny of the democratic processes, but also of the Croatian state itself, depends on wheter it is force or reason thet will be the winner. The Croatian policy in Bosnia and Hercegovina will show how much it differs from Serbian expansionist policy.
d. When considered the number of those brutally killed, imprisoned oor banished, then the Bosnien ("Muslems") are no doubt the most tragic people. It is tragic thet there was a national race impiosed on the Bosnien ("Moslims") and even more thet they accepted it. Even if they did not accept the principle of national organizations, if they did not have this political leadership which had taken on the responsibility for its national leadership, it still remains doubtful whether the thingswould have turned out better in the end. The reason is very simple: militant systems must sacrifice a certain social category if thet are to maintain themselved. hitler secrificed the Jews, Stalin the "trotskies", serbien nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina and probebli also in Sandæak are sacrificing the Moslims (among others, but particulsty them). Would something have changed for the Jews had they consented to become Germans, for the "trockies" had they become Stalinists or for the Muslims had they become Serbs? Nothing. They were sacrificed "in the name of the system" even before. The Jews, as economicall the most powerful cathegory, payed Hitler the first of nazism, the "Trotskies" increased Stalin's competitiveness of socialism with their free labour, and the Moslims, ravaged, banished and massacred, made it possible for the Serbien nationalism to verify its military superiority and also to conquer new life-spece.
However, the main mistake of the national political structures of the Bosnien ( Mosnims) was the fact thet they confused the notions of nation, religion, party and state and, therefore, not all the patriotic forces and those of which the only chance to survive was to fight, appeared in the program for rescue. The second important failure was the fact thet till the very begining of the aggression on Sarajevo, they did not do much to take the challenges of the inevitable aggression, which gives no chances to the force of the arguments (they even claimed thet there would ne no war), but the lives of both whole nations and individuals depend on the promptitude to fight against the aggression.
To tell the truth, the tragedy of the Bosnien (Muslem) nation is thet it is the only nation in Bosnia without a spare home-land and it could defend itself only if supported by others. Thet fact proably was the only chance for the coalition of anti-nazi forces or for the assurance of the world community.
The acceptance of ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina would reduce the territory for life of the Bosnien Muslims into a very narrow and insufficient one, it would also practically legalize the occupation of the territories were there was the greatest number of the Boisnien Muslims and it would grant amnesty to the crimes commited. Moreover, such a stat lying between some bigger states (Croatian-Chatplic and Serbian-Orthodox one), would practically only postpone its further functioning and also a total annihilation if the crisis of the systems in Belgrade and Zagreb sacrificed small Moslem Bosnia again. In thet case the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a sovereing, integral and independent state, or rether, according to the new proposal, it does not have to be integral but the etnical principle should be respected, is its chance and also the chance for the Moslims. Hower, all that would be only with the assurance of force instrumentalized by the international law.
e. As regerds Macedonia, there are at present a lot of uncertainties and anticipations for something to heppen. The international recognition of Macedonia or the worst: the war between Albania and Serbia. The biggest number of votes was for the Macedonian national party VMRO, but its autority is not so strong at present simply because of the fact that national intoxication has not so far made happy other Yugoslav natons, as well as the estimate that the tansion in the international relations in Macedonia would not be wise. Macedonia is playing for time and for the depreciation of national passions. In thet sanse the policy of Kiro Gligorov, who succeeds in preserving peace, legal security and at least an elementary consent of everyone in Macedonia, deserves now a special attention.
What should be kept in mind now regarding the circumstances in Macedonia is the fact thet the Serbian nationalism has already disarmed Macedonia (the withdrawal of JNA), thet bacause of thet it has also been made much weaker from the economic point of view but practically also preserved in the times of the final retribution. The Serbs have not left Macedonia becouse they wish it luck and independence, but on the first place, to play for time and to postpone the possibility of the new front-line. Very important is the influence of the ortodox Church which did not allow for any conflicts within the orthodox creed (in its essence it is cleronacionalism). Serbien nationalism counts with a possibility to win the Macedonians relatively quickly to their side in the future war between Albania and Serbia. A part of Skopje's airodrome still exercises functions of Serbian armed forces.
The wartime division of Macedonia would have tragic consequences for the nation thet did not at all deserve the Golgotha thet awaits it. The Macedonians are a cordial, peaceful and a very tragic nation. In its first policy of formation of Greece (within its present borders) there was a genocide over Egeian Macedonians, their depopulation and ethnic assimilation. It was during the period after the second world war and a figure thet was never officially astablishedat (some sources round it to) 2 million victims. It is interesting thet Serbian policy constiders Macedonia to be Southern Serbia, or rather, it advocates its confederation with Greece since it is silent on the fact of the existence of Macedonia in between. Surely Serbia will actuate this territory in the phase of the disentanglement of the chaos in Kosovo. During peace and peaceful solutions of the crisis on certain territories such associations are desirable if thet express a true wish and interests of the protagonists, but in the case of the formation by the use of force of artificial and new states, as has so far been the case with the Great Serbia, the formation of such association would cartainly imply a new war tactics with balcanic and European features.
13. The present state of affairs in serbia is such thet its nationalism wants to set free the already utilized instittion of the name of Yugoslavia. It wants to envelop itself in the name from which it has departed and toward which it is going, in the name Serbia. It is under thet light that one should consider the demonstrations of force and of Serbian government over the federal one, the raid in the rooms of the Secretaria of Public Security, the criticism of Panic etc. Milo(pi)evic knows that the war has given him strength and that it is the only way him to maintain himself. Thus he applied for the support of the Serbian army and got it. The army emphasized thet it would not use force against him. His victory in the next elections is is not to be doubted both because of disloyal competition in the mass-media and because of the maintenance of the state of war and tension in Serbia itself. Milo(pi)evic's regime is simply not in the position to offer Serbian people anything but what has been taken from others (Bosniens, Croats, Albanians, Hungarians), and he gave them the force of the army thet had once been theirs too (Yugoslav National Army), he gave them legal amnesty of pillage and crime. Thet is enough for the moment but inadequate and insufficient for the final outcome as it is true thet the most tragic of all is the people surrounded by the more numerous enemies. It is hard to be Serbian at the moment if one is outside of Serbian domination, and it is hard not to be one within its bounds. It will be so untill there is a balance of fear and force. Then will the diameter of its encirclement become larger then the one of the extreme nationalism, end the tragic consequences of the people intoxicated by nazism are inevitable (Germans, Italians, Japanese and so on, during the second world war).
14. What has been said so far seems logic enough, but the fact is thet the world community was quite apart from all this, it made moves thet did not show what it wanted. It recognized Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and it did not provide for the meshanism of defence tha would vouch for it, it did not allow the aquisition of weapons though it knew thet the aggression was inevitable and thet the superiority of the aggressor was anormous.
The proposal of the cantonization of Bosna and Herzegovina anly reinforced the ambitions of etnic cleansing, given thet the notion of canton in the west belongs to economical and cultural cathegory, and hare it is a question of life and death. Hare one should add that a very strong diplomacy of Serbien nazism resumed under the name of the infliential federal state of Yugoslavia, which had systematically and masterly deceived the world hiding its real intentions and its crimes. (The raid of Serbian police in the rooms of the federal police and the demonstration of force and one of its aims is the seizure of the documents on the perpetrated crimes "in the name of the federal state"). Surely a part of this alliance of aggression is in the weaknesses, ignorance and underdevelopment of the democracy of the countries and of the people under ettack. One should keep in mind the fact that the world military lobby needs a war forcus as a territory for the use of arms. Practically during the whole period after the second wprld war, there are other wars going on all the time, just because their sites are changing. It is not for America's sake that the European Community should become more powerful, but thet is so also for some forces within Europe itself. The disguise of the real crimes in ex-Yugoslavia, or even stirring towards war can be a part of political games of dismembermant of European Community over the back of Yugoslavia, which certainly is mostly due to the light-mindedness of the ex-government and of the promoter of the new one, or rather, it is the territory of ex-Yugoslavia which is an exprimentalist territory for the contemplation of the possible solution in the USSR, where there was a lot of presumptions for nazism.
15. A more fortunate solution to the Yugoslav problem cold have been achieved if the world community had been able to seize the essence of it in time and if it had been willing to, and if it had had enough force to stop the worst from happening. After the aggression in Slovenia and the recognition of its indepandance from Yugoslavia, it was foolish to allow the army machinery, the police, the conferences and similar to make states for themselves which ware destined to remain what they are-statal institutions. It should have been noted that Serbian nationalism under the slogan of fight against the seccession of others and the fight for Yugoslavia was making a seccession itself. Thet the use of the name Yugoslavia was in fact only a legalization of crimes and the fight for legal succession of what Yugoslavia had both home and abroad in the material, diplomatic and other sense.
As regerds the destiny of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is very much determined by the political orientation of Belgrade and Zagreb. The slogan: "All the Serbs in one states!" solved the Serbien dilemma on its relationship with Bosna and Herzegovina but also the essence and the name of thet state. The Serbo_Croat demarcation implied in practice this division also in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here one has to keep in mind the secret meeting of Tuman and Milo(pi)evic, the actual conflicts between the armed forces of Croatian army and the Bosnian ones, Serbo-Croat political and military alliance in the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also all thet has been done so far by the Serbian armed forces to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and to clean it etnically.
The high level of civilizational integration in Bosnia and Herzegovina both in the field of culture and economy, the there were more than 42% of the population who already were genetically mixed, that the people lived there because they had to, but because they loved to be there, unfortunately all of thet has not yet helped to prevent and stop the Golgotha of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The world humanitarian institutions are at present dealing with the improvement of sanitary conditions of the consequences of the aggression with the delivery of humanitarian support, with the acceptance of refugees but still nothing in particular is being done to change the conditions thet have led to the aggression and to punish the criminals.
16. The humanitarian support to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also to ither territories revaged by the war or those of ethnic cleansing and of the massacres of ex-Yugoslavia should consist of 3 dimensions of support. Firstly: It shuld insistt on all the important factors (national, religious, political, humanitarian) to stop the killing of the innocent, the devastation of cities and civilizational achievements. In that sense the aggressive policy should be unmasked, and it is in facts that one must talk about the suffering and abaut those who caused it. Humanitarian support should be intensified in the jeopardized territories emphasizing the decisiveness and courage because it is a necessary condition for thousands and even millions of men. Finally, evacuation and acceptance of the most jeopardized cathegories of people from those territories in states, centres of acceptance and rehabilitation (children, womwn, pregnant womwn, the wounded, the old the disabled).
The second kind of support to the jeopardized territories in ex-Yugoslavia and to the suffering nations should make the necessary prereguisite conditions for the military assistence to neutralize the aggressor. The reason for that is very simple, being thet the only effective mans to oppose the nazi forces, or rather, being it the force belonging to the opposite direction of the similar, or even higher intensity, founded on the humanitarian basis to stop the evils of nazism. All of that should be done respecting the main starting points and decrees of the international law on war which is an importand distinction from the starting poit of nazism, to which nothing is sacred, where ands justify means.
In tret sense, the military assistance to the jeopardized territories (weapons, laying off of the embargo on their importation, more man-power for defence) and an anti-nazi coalition made up pf all the anti-nazi forces is indispensable. These forces should be formed out of Serbian anti-nazi oriented population, of the so far jeopardized nattions and a nation which would with an intensive engagement prevent both the conflict in the Balcans and in Europe and its own suffering. A fortunate solution to the problem would be the international arbitration with military interventing the clash of revenge of other nationalisms on Serbian or on other nations in the Balcans.
17. The following facts speak in favour of the previous evaluations and estimates:
-Besides what has been emphasized and the declaratively eccepted principle of the nacessary democratic changes on the whole of the southernslavic territory in Belgrade, the previous regime succeeded in maintaining itself. To tell the truth, it appeared in a new national attire which no doubt gives the answer about whom it had actually been protecting: the Serbian nation or itself.
-The communist suthorities have accepted fascists-Chetnics for their allies who needed them to do for them the most sirdid job of killing people and of ravaging of towns. General Adæic, a victim of the terror of Ustashas, was not by pure chance a spokesman of the armed forces of JNA. It is not by chance that complex-ridden children of Chetniks (Karadæic, Ostojic, "anËar, and others) or Chetniks during the second world war or neo-Cetniks (Se(pi)elj) got the role of the executors, or rather, 40% of the votes in Serbian Assembly ((DELTA)ecelj's radicalista).
- On the side of the Serbian nationalism, cleronationalism and later on nazism, there is the third army in Europe (JNA), which by withdrawing the weapons from Territorial defence forces, firms and schools has practically disarmed all other southern Slavs, and by giving the same weapons to the Serbs, it provided for them all the prerequisites for genocide, pillage and etnic cleansing.
- Even if the aggression had begun because of the "jeopardized" Serbs, who unlike all the nations in the world "have to live within one single state", by analizing the territories exposed to aggression, the revaged towns etc. one can see thet they do not belong to Serbia (Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Sarajevo, Jajce, GradaËac, FoËa, Vi(pi)egrad, BrËko,...). So far there is no town in Serbia which has been exposed to aggression, not even with a single bullet, there has not been killed a single Serbian as opposed to non-Serbian population who has been the object of systematic coercion, torture, andlead to concentration camps or killed.
- The agreement on peace suits Serbian nationalist policy there where it has actuated the tergets of its extreme aggression. One should remember Napoleon in Moscow or Hitler before Moscow whwn they needed peace bedly. The problem is only thet neither one of them had arrived there peacefully but by waging war, killing, ravaging so thet the only efficacious medicine was force. In thet sense the most efficatious means for peace is the improvement of sanitary conditions of the consequences of the aggressive demonstrations of force in ex-Yugoslavia is the anti-nazi force which will re-establish peace and ratify the aggressive use of force, and after that, there come movements for peace agein (as the one in Sarajevo before the war) which act as mediators in social conflicts and remove the conditions and cause which may lead towards new discharge of aggression and war.
- Although teoretically there are no differences among nationalisms, cleronationalism and nazism of Serbs, Croats, Moslems, Hungarians or Germans what varies is the quantity of instrumentalization of exclusivism, hatred and force with wich a certain evil has been perpetrated to the opposite side. In thet sense identifying the Serbian nazism with a national gethering of the people for their defence would be a cardinal mistake. Thet is precisely what is being done to do something thet could save the lives of the still living.
18. The war thet is being waged in ex-Yugoslavia (massacres of people and revaging of towns) is a classical example of aggression, it is a scholastic example of occupation. In the very moment when the ex-JNA decided to give its military support to the Serbian national program, it became the Serbian army, what means thet then any territory apart from the Serbuan and Montenegran stopped being its own. The cardinal mistake of the international factors who were prone to preserve peace in ex-Yugoslavia is thet they did not see thet and thet they ratified the use of yhe army of another state on the territories of the already recognized new states. Then there is also a cardinal gamboling with Serbian people which one profession (military), one state (ex-Yugoslavia) and one failed perty (communist) dhose for the defence of its own positions (profession, rule, politics). If one keeps in mind a strong pressure on their passions like fear and revengefulness, on both spiritual and physical components, it can with reason be claimed that nobody even asked them "whether they wanted it or not", whether they wented to be the most hateful people in the world, a genocidal nation "in the name of which" everything thet is sacred is being destroyed including people and their children, churches, cemeteries, towns. Inits essence it was only a farce and a banal form where everything was known, mapped out and designed. Similar is the destiny of the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, being it also designed for them (without them in Belgrad, Zagreb, partly Sarajevo and some other towns presently not specified).
19. The thesis which states that in ex-Yugoslavia there is a civil war going on is unacceptable, too being wrong in its essence. The national programs put before themselves the interest of their nation and not of their civilians. For national and nazi programs there is only the "secred" interest of the nation which can embrace enything: genocide and fight for power, the revagning of towns. "Citizen" in the European sense of the word has nothing to do with it and it ahould be preserved at least as a neme.
20. On the territory of ex-Yugoslavia there is neither a clasish between the nations but it has been artificiall brought about as said before. A human being has been reduced to a cathegory of number, nationality and soldier, the one who is to be killed or who has to kill. Here is both the starting point and the target of nazism and it is a fact on the territory of its domination. The is the answer to why the towns of Podrinja, which are occupied by the Serbs, on the territories where the Serbs were more dominant before aggression, there are neither live nor matierial proofs of their existence (churches, cemeteries, houses, people, all gone). This deceived the domestic and the foreign public opinion by drawing their attention towards Sarajevo, Mostar (comung of Miterrand, Panic and others), it is there thet one can see what is happening, there thet solidiers are waging such a war, yet on the broader territoty of Podrinje or posavina people are just killing one another. The figure of about half a million killed is neither wrong nor final.
21. The war in ex-Yugoslavia cannot be called religious either. Thet also is one of the ways to conceal the real essence of the aggression. It is true thet religious institutions have given their support to national programs. They lant them a whole religious iconography. Yet, that, too, is a way of trying to hide the essence of aggression on the basis of religious internationalization. the thesis which states thet in Bosnia and Herzegovina they want to fond an Islamic state as a springboard for the Islamic expansion is the thesis with which serbian bazism wants to get the nationalism the ethnic division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the forseable future formally and legally connecting its canot to the mother country of Croatia. In thet sense the problem of the defence of the lives of the Moslems on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia it cannot and it should not be a problem of Islamic countries as they are first of all Europeans and therefore a European problem, whwre Europe will have to pass a leaving examination and civic orientation.
22. Why would Europe, the civic and the united world intervene in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia?
Those who think thet justice is on the side of the victims of the aggression and therefore the law too, forget that law and justice are not the same and they usually cannot be found on the same place. As in human history force and reason rarely ever were on the same side. Law ratifies incriminated values (proclaimed by the ruling forces) from whwre it follows thet the incriminated and really naturally human values do not have to imply the same. By thet they do not have to by ratifid legally and in the sama way. The aggressor is excellently acquainted with these weaknesses of the modern world. The is why he imposed a structure on its effectiveness among conferences, declarations, commisions and articles and its own victims among concentration camps, deportations and mass graves.
Keeping this in mind as well as the fact thet the contemporary world, no matter how it is being called and no matter how it called itself, is founded on a very particular and no dobt egoistic interest, then one chould not expect it to take the necessary steps to stop nazism helping others, but helping itself on the first place. In thet sense the modern world has lot of reasons to help itself at last.
The instrumentalized nationalisms, somewhare nazisms, were the effective means for the subversion of socialism but they turned out to have grown into nazisms hare and there (Serbia and probably Russia). They became the destroyers of all the civilizational rangers, of both the material and the spiritual ones but also the effective genocide.
The contemporary world has grown up on the foundations of the civilization ravaged by nazism, that is where its passive and helpless observation of the raging of nazism, grown by connecting communism and fascism, comes from today, though it looks unbelievable. Not even half a million killed, of which 80% civilians, dozens of ravaged towns, horrible pictures, millions of refugees and similar suffering, can awake its memory on those pictures already lived up of the nazi raging and with thet its own fear for the future of the world it created.
The world consented to improve the senitary conditions of the consequences of the nazi raging accepting 2 million refugees, sending humanitarian support and troops for seperation but by these very actions it becomes the accomplice or the donator of nazism. The nazists want to evacuate people, to reduce them down to the limit of the artificial maintenance with the humanitarian support, from whwre nazists themselves claim to be donators. (The peak of cinicism and sarcasm is surely humanitarian help thet is sent by the Belgrade to the citizens of Sarajevo, the very same Yugoslavia and the same Belgrade which sends trucks of lorries full of shells to the same city and to thet very same peple daily!?)
The world will have to understand thet the instrumentalized nazism is becoming an effective means for the subversion of all the systems not all the socialist ones but also those in the assence of which the quality of nation, race and religion is not favoured and themselves too for differing one from another.
Granting amnesty to the killing of half a million innocent people on the territory of ex-Ygoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, will grant amnesty also to new killing alt over the world. The new killers will look for their "Bosnians" and justify themselves with their being "in jeopardy".
The only sin of the people who are being killed in Bosnia and Herzegovina is thet they did not get ready for the opposition to the militant nazism and that today they do not have anough force to stop it (the world does not allow them to also because they declared that they wanted a part of civic Europe because they fo not have any social, genetical and geographical choice. It is strange that the same Europe supports them with silence.
Bosnia and Herzegovina or the whole retritory of ex-Yugoslavia is not Kuwait and the world will not strive to help there but it is Balkan and Europe, and, by helping to save innocent people there, the world is helping itself.
Prof. mr. Sevko Kadric,
expert international conflicts, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina This manuscript was received by the Schiller Institute in Stockholm, november 1992.
